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Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
In den letzten Jahren waren die Grundprinzipien und Ziele der russischen Außenpolitik innerhalb 
Rußlands heftig umstritten. Auch für Außenstehende war das Verhalten der russischen Führung 
mitunter  schwer  zu  deuten.  Mittel-  und  langfristig  ist  aber  eine  kohärente  außenpolitische 
Konzeption ein  vitales  Bedürfnis für  Rußland.  Die  Gründe dafür  sind elementar:  Nur  eine 
ausbalancierte  und  sorgfältig  durchdachte außenpolitische Strategie,  die  von den relevanten 
gesellschaftlichen Kräften getragen wird,  kann das Land vor "sektiererischen" ideologischen 
Schemata,  unprofessionellen  "Experten"  und  fragwürdigen  internationalen  Verpflichtungen 
bewahren.
Der vorliegende Bericht, der aus der Feder zweier namhafter russischer Wissenschaftler stammt, 
unternimmt den Versuch, den Rahmen für eine Außenpolitik zu formulieren, die die nationalen 
Interessen wahrt und die internationale Position Rußlands sichert. Vor den Präsidentenwahlen 
verfaßt,  weist  der  Text  in  seinem grundsätzlichen Umgang mit  dem Problem auch  für  die 
Zukunft mögliche Wege für eine russische Außenpolitik.
Ergebnisse
1. Es ist Zeit, daß die russischen politischen Eliten Rußlands nationale Interessen klar artikulie-
ren. Das Fehlen einer solchen ausformulierten Position hat westliche Beobachter dazu ver-
anlaßt, Sorge über eine mögliche Unberechenbarkeit russischen Verhaltens zum Ausdruck 
zu bringen. Eine neue russische außenpolitische Strategie kann aber nur  das Ergebnis 
intensiver  konzeptioneller  Diskussionen  innerhalb  der  russischen  politischen  und 
intellektuellen Elite selbst sein. Bekannt ist, daß die russische Gesellschaft gegenwärtig 
keine klaren sozialen, politischen und dementsprechend auch keine deutlich markierten 
ideologischen  Unterschiede  aufweist.  Dennoch  ist  eine  Reihe  außenpolitischer 
Perzeptionen zu erkennen, die gewissermaßen als politische Plattformen aufgefaßt werden 
können: neokommunistische, radikal nationalistische und traditional konservative, die sich 
alle - in unterschiedlicher Weise - aus der russischen, bzw. der sowjetischen Vergangenheit 
nähren.
2. Die Politik der postkommunistischen Regierung war vor allem ein kontextuelles Phänomen. 
Sie entstand in Abgrenzung zur Außenpolitik der kommunistischen Ära, entwickelte aber 
bedauerlicherweise kaum eigene kreative Grundsätze. Es ist allgemein bekannt, daß nach 
dem Zerfall der UdSSR praktisch alle traditionellen Einflußsphären aufgegeben, neue aber 
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nicht gesichert wurden. Grundkomponente dieser Politik war die Aufgabe geopolitischer 
Ziele zugunsten von ideologischen Vorstellungen über eine abstrakte Demokratie.
3. Drei  Jahre  der  Schwäche und  Unsicherheit  haben überzeugend die  Notwendigkeit  einer 
kohärenten, berechenbaren und dynamischen Außenpolitik demonstriert. Die Grundzüge 
einer solchen Konzeption können folgendermaßen zusammengefaßt werden: Erstens, eine 
dynamische und pragmatische Bewertung der globalen Entwicklung. Zweitens, eine stär-
kere Betonung von Geopolitik, auf deren Basis die internationale Rolle Rußlands stets be-
stimmt wurde und in Zukunft auch bestimmt werden wird. Geopolitisches Denken muß 
auch die Grundlage einer konstruktiven Suche nach Bündnispartnern im "nahen" und 
"fernen" Ausland sein. Dabei ist das Territorium der früheren Sowjetunion eine Region 
vitalen russischen Interesses. Drittens sollte Außenpolitik als Instrument für den Schutz der 
Russen außerhalb Rußlands eingesetzt werden können. Schließlich sollte Rußland nicht 
davor zurückscheuen, in geopolitischen Auseinandersetzungen mit allen Ländern - auch 
mit  entwickelten Industrieländern - energische, dynamische und wirksame Schritte auf 
wirtschaftlichem, politischen und militärischen Gebiet zu unternehmen.
4. Regional sollte die vordringliche Aufgabe russischer Außenpolitik die Schaffung eines inte-
grierten Wirtschaftsraums im "nahen Ausland" sein (sofern die Bevölkerung dies wünscht) 
sowie die Durchsetzung internationaler Menschenrechtsstandards, die auch der Verteidi-
gung  der  Rechte  der  russischsprechenden  Bevölkerung  dienen.  Rußland  sollte  eine 
führende Rolle  dabei  spielen,  diese Standards in  Verträgen zwischen den Staaten  der 
früheren Sowjetunion durchzusetzen.
5. Mit den USA sollte Rußland insbesondere bei der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Atomwaffen 
und auf dem Gebiet der sicheren Beseitigung von Atomwaffen auf dem Territorium der 
früheren Sowjetunion zusammenarbeiten. Auch beim Schutz von Menschenrechten in den 
früheren  Sowjetrepubliken,  bei  der  Rüstungskontrolle  zur  Erlangung  internationaler 
Stabilität  und  bei  der  gegenseitigen Verständigung im Vorfeld potentieller  ethnischer, 
konfessioneller oder rassischer Konflikte ist eine Kooperation möglich. Insbesondere an der 
"Peripherie" des globalen Systems könnte dies ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Stabilisierung 
sein.  Bilateral  sollten  Rußland  und  USA  die  wirtschaftlichen  Beziehungen  ohne 
gegenseitige Diskriminierung ausbauen.
6. Im Blick auf Europa gibt es gewisse Hemmnisse, da einerseits einige westeuropäische Re-
gierungen gegenüber der Integration Rußlands in den europäischen Prozeß Vorbehalte ha-
ben und andererseits in Rußland die Notwendigkeit dieser Integration nicht unbestritten ist. 
Nichtsdestoweniger gibt es einen breiten Konsens in der gegenwärtigen russischen Gesell-
schaft,  daß  bilaterale  Zusammenarbeit  mit  den  führenden  kontinentalen  Mächten 
(Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien) und mit dem Vereinigten Königreich unumgänglich ist. 
Der Ausbau der Beziehungen zu diesen Staaten wird es einfacher machen, die diskriminie-
renden Bestimmungen auf den Außenhandelsmärkten zu beseitigen und eine volle Beteili-
gung an der internationalen Arbeitsteilung zu erreichen. In diesem Sinne ist Rußlands Mit-
arbeit im Internationalen Währungsfonds, bei den G-7- und in den Post-CoCom-Institutio-
nen sehr wichtig.
7. Die Reorganisation der sicherheitspolitischen Strukturen - insbesondere die Erweiterung der 
NATO - wird erhebliche Kosten für die Staaten Westeuropas nach sich ziehen. Eine wirkli-
che Diskussion der NATO-Erweiterung hat noch nicht begonnen. Daran werden sich auch 
die Staaten Südeuropas beteiligen, die vor allem Interesse am Ausbau der sozialen Siche-
rungen haben und die den Ausbau der NATO als kontraproduktiv empfinden. Es könnte zu 
einer Umgruppierung der politischen Kräfte in dieser Region kommen.
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8. Rußlands strategische Interessen im Raum Asien und Pazifik bestehen vor allem in der Auf-
rechterhaltung der  territorialen Integrität  der  Rußländischen Föderation im Fernen Osten. 
Dazu sollte der Aufbau eines regionalen Sicherheitssystems angestrebt und Rüstungsliefe-
rungen in diese Region zu einem Thema der Kooperation mit den USA gemacht werden. Die 
innere Stabilität  von China und Indien, den beiden bevölkerungsreichsten Staaten, ist  für 
Rußland von grundsätzlichem Interesse.
Introduction
During the past decade or so, the life of political sciences, foreign policy analysis in particular, 
has become more complex and, consequently, less predictable. The reason is quite obvious: the 
recent world development itself has become much more controversial than, say, 30 or even 20 
years ago. We do not see (some of us, perhaps the most perceptive, sense) how the world changes, 
how influence shifts between countries, regions or  "actors"/participants in the economic and 
political  process, or  how institutions adjust  to  newly-emergent realities.  During the time of 
relative stability, that is the Cold War period, social scientists normally exploited established 
cognitive  paradigms  to  help  our  interpretation  and  understanding.  Still,  when  change  has 
accelerated, new approaches are required, new modes of analysis then need to answer recently 
emergent sets of questions.
It is, therefore, quite problematic to advance a simple explanation for such a controversial and 
heterogeneous phenomenon as Russia's national interests and foreign policy perceptions. Con-
sequently, the analysis of this phenomenon will inevitably reflect a  corresponding degree of 
complexity, itself being part and parcel a manifestation of fundamental social, political and geo-
political transformations during the last decade.
From the mid-80s on, Russia's intellectual life has become more intricate in several respects. It 
has developed unevenly in the country's regions and with different rhythms and intensities in 
various social and professional groupings. Within this period, the "political society" has also 
diversified its institutional models, value orientations, social activities and analytical approaches.
In discussing foreign policy, one may assume that the country's mode of international behaviour 
should be based on the following fundamental and uncompromised principles:
• rigorous definition of contemporary Russia's national/civilizational identity;
• precise formulation of foreign policy priorities, vital interests and threats to its security;
• perceptive  understanding  of  the  forces  (economic,  political,  cultural,  demographic  etc.) 
shaping the world system and the capacity, sustained by political will, to act accordingly in 
the outer world;
• national consensus existing among the politically significant interest groups of Civil Society 
on the main foreign policy goals as well as conscious abstention from exploiting foreign policy 
for egoistic promotion of vested "sectional" interests.
Apparently the whole process of foreign policy elaboration will  have a  positive character to 
ensure the real possibility for a  creative renovation of "Soviet" and "post-Soviet" paradigms, 
especially  since  the  dominant  philosophy  of  foreign  policy  (which  may  be  regarded  as 
"cosmopolitan") most likely corresponds to the transition period of formation of the Russian 
government-and-politics system, which has come to a close.
The formation of a new democratic, and at the same time genuinely national, political philosophy 
is  vitally  important  to  Russia.  Connected to  both local  and  world  politics,  this  affects the 
country's ability to influence the course of international events. Without conceptual deliberation 
of a new foreign policy and all the while preserving the course under which the national specifics 
of Russia's foreign interests remain unclear, the desired international solidarity of democratic 
societies and serious discussion with potential partners cannot begin. Nor can a suspended line of 
communication with potential adversaries be resumed.
For obvious historical, political and ideological reasons, the post-Soviet foreign policy has re-
mained obscure and, in essence, has become a  hindrance to the development of the nation's 
relationship with the world.
Putting it shortly, the time has come for Russian political elites to clearly and unequivocally 
define Russia's national interests, making a clear statement that the interests of Russia and of all 
advanced members of the world community can not coincide altogether. In fact, Russia has no 
other option now than to unambigously articulate the specific national interests of the country 
and to clearly explain that these interests are vital to its foreign policy and to the very existence of 
Russian society. The absence of coherent foreign policy doctrine has even compelled Western 
counterparts to express a concern about a potentially unpredictable international behaviour of our 
country.  At first  glance, the primary reason for  the complicated,  paradoxical  situation with 
Russian foreign policy is Moscow's persistent appeal for partnership with industrially advanced 
nations. However, these same countries have not yet  set a  definition in their foreign policy 
strategies for such a partnership with Russia or any optimal way to facilitate such a partnership. 
The interest of mature spheres of international association with the Russian Federation for the 
most part is painted in negative shades. An idea what a  new Russia should not be is not a 
coherent substitution of the notion of what Russia can and should be.
However, it is hardly reasonable to reproach the West because no "outsider" can explain to us 
how our foreign policy should be defined and performed. It is the fundamental responsibility of 
the Russian intellectual and political elites to elaborate and articulate the views concerning in-
ternational relations at this new stage of world development. Russia also should clearly indicate 
the contours of its own national (strategic) interests. These interests should be the systemic basis 
for foreign policy tasks and priorities. Russia's incorporation into the advanced field of world 
association (which may juridically hasten the formation of a  viable system of partnerships) 
should be implemented by productive and equal cooperation on a diverse number of fundamental 
problems of foreign policy.
Russian Political Elites: Basic Approaches to New Foreign Policy
Russia's new foreign policy strategy can only emerge out of the sharp and conceptual debates 
within Russian political and intellectual elites in an arena occupied by the institutions of legisla-
tive power despite the essentially deliberative character of the State Duma and the actual intel-
lectual potential of this body.
Although the dichotomy (communists vs. anticommunists) still persists in the intellectual dis-
course, a  kind of atomization has already emerged in both ideological camps. For objective 
historical reasons, Russia (at least for the last 7 decades) has not experienced the influence of 
foreign policy philosophy sustained by common sense and directed towards the rational com-
prehension of fundamental requirements of the indigenous state and society. The state ideology 
shaped relationships not only between ruling elite and civil society but, also, between abstract 
political goals, on the one side, and the necessity to act in the World System on the principles of 
realpolitik and the actual figuration of the main forces, on the other. Nowadays, the time has 
come to renovate the obsolete mode of thinking and to understand that Russia is not simply the 
ideological framework of some political regime but a subject in the arena of international rela-
tions and the embodiment of a certain national ("civilizational") identity.
From the medium- and long-term perspective, a coherent foreign policy philosophy is a  vital 
requirement for Russia. The reason is quite obvious: a well balanced and carefully deliberated 
foreign policy strategy enjoying the support of Society's main socio-political forces can protect 
the country from imposition of "sectional" ideological schemes (in this case the shattering of 
Russia's international standing is inevitable), non-professional handling by international relations 
"experts" and disputable foreign political assignments, to quote just a few.
It is well-known that contemporary Russian society has no clear-cut social, political and, con-
sequently, ideological distinctions. Still,  one can easily distinguish a  series of foreign policy 
perceptions that  can be regarded as political platforms - naturally,  with certain reservations. 
Following the well established Russian historical tradition, we will begin with the radical leftist 
tendencies, to move gradually to the right side of political spectrum.
The  neocommunist "paradigm".  The neocommunist perceptions originate, first and foremost, 
from two ideological sources: 1) continuity of the "Third Rome" political philosophy modernized 
by the communist elite and adapted to the realities of configuration of forces existing in world 
politics in the first half of the 20th century and 2) necessity to reestablish the former Soviet Union 
(not so explicitly now than, say, 2-3 years back) and, accordingly, Soviet foreign policy to retain 
pre-1985 equilibrium in world politics. Within this mode of thinking, the principal menace to 
Russia's security is,  naturally,  the West,  the  United States  in  particular.  Being emotionally 
attractive,  especially  for  elder  demographic  groups,  neocommunist  "platform"  is  open  to 
criticism.  Worth  mentioning  are  two  points.  Firstly,  the  most  vulnerable  position  for  the 
neocommunists  is  their  inability  to  deliver  the  true  "Russian  idea".  In  public  opinion,  the 
neocommunists are still regarded as Soviets, not Russians.1
Secondly,  communists being remnants of the Soviet  past,  their  proposals (including foreign 
policy projections) are obsolete and impractical and as a whole are not supported by the intelli-
gentsia or the economically active segments of the People.
Russian  traditionalism is  more socio-cultural  than  political  phenomenon. Nevertheless,  it  is 
relevant here for the purposes of political analysis to recognize at least two trends of political 
significance - radical nationalism and traditional conservatism (Pochvennitchestvo).
Radical nationalism. In distinction from cosmopolitan slogans of the neocommunists, radical 
nationalism appeals to the Russian national consciousness and therefore will have a formidable 
say in the formation of Russian foreign policy philosophy. In our humble opinion, the statements 
that: 1) criticism by radical nationalists of the post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy was based on 
skill and knowledge and 2) that these attacks were the factor of a certain evolution of foreign 
policy  perceptions in  the  last  2  years  are  no  exaggeration.  Radical  nationalists  efficiently 
exploited such blunders in the Russian foreign policy as the violations of human rights of the 
Russian-speaking population in  the  "near  abroad",  the Baltic  States  in  particular,  and  also 
vulnerability of the Russian consciousness due to the loss of superpower status and the country's 
loss of territory.2
"However, radical nationalism has a weak side, the incorporation of the idea of territorial re-
vanchism... The implementation of such a task would require truly colossal costs."3 In our view, 
1 It is  not  accidental  that  Communist  leaders  prefer to  identify themselves with the "Patriotic" segment of 
Russian society. One can easily guess that conflicts of interests between Communists and "Patriots" (in fact 
Russian  traditionalists)  are  irreversible  and  will  affect  the  party's  performance in  the  1995  State  Duma 
elections.
2 The notion  of regaining the lost  Russian  territories  is  disputed  by the proponents  of  the concept  of the 
"Russian Ethnic State" (though Byelorussia, Eastern and Southern Ukraine as well as Northern Kazakhstan 
are considered to be organic parts of the Russian Federation). The idea of "ethnic purity" propagated by some 
sections of the nationalists has a substantial social following in Russia.
the  notion  of  reestablishing  the  Empire4 is  undoubtedly  the  undermining  point  of  radical 
nationalist doctrine.
Traditional conservatism. This ideological trend was formerly referred to as "Pochvennichestvo" 
(the "back-to-the-soil" movement). So far as political orientations of Russian traditionalists are 
concerned, the conservatives concentrate on the preservation of territorial integrity of the Russia 
that exists nowadays; they are not enthused by the notion of Russia reemerging as a superpower5. 
The strong suit of this school of thought is the preservation of Russia's civilizational identity and 
national characteristics as well as the notion of economic, political and cultural independence of 
Russia. According to the traditional thinking, Russia is self-valuing and, therefore, has particular 
"moral" mission of its own.
Being psychologically attractive, the traditional approach has a number of weaknesses. First, 
traditionalists underestimate Russia's involvement into the global economic and political proc-
esses. "Self-reliance" as a kind of economic autarchy is hardly an option for a rapidly developing 
industrial society like that of contemporary Russia's. Second, the rapid industrialization, enforced 
by successive governments before and after 1917,  laid the foundations for industrial society. 
Within industrial society, basic elements of civic culture have started to develop. Thus, being 
emotionally appealing, the traditional conservatism does not address basic trends regulating the 
development of a modern industrial (and post-industrial) society.
"Post-Communist" Foreign Policy Perceptions
The present government's foreign policy philosophy is mainly a contextual phenomenon. Being a 
rebuttal  to  communist  foreign policy this course initially incorporated a  great  deal  of anti-
communist zeal but, unfortunately, few creative principles. It's common knowledge, that after the 
demise of  the  Soviet  Union practically  all  traditional  spheres and  regions of  the  country's 
influence were abandoned while new ones were not secured.6 The basic components of this 
foreign policy were: geopolitical consideration were sacrificed in favour of ideological notions of 
an abstract democracy (democracy is always concrete, its form and content are usually related to 
historical  experience of  the  Society,  to  the  interests  articulated  by  various  nascent  social, 
professional and other groups);
3 S. Kortunov/A. Kortunov: From "Moralism" to "Pragmatics": New Dimensions of Russian Foreign Policy, - 
"Comparative Strategy", Washington, Vol. 13, 1994, p. 263.
4 One of the most ardent proponents of the "Great Russia" (Velikaya Rus') is the former Russian vice-president 
Alexander  Rutskoi.  However,  his  views  on  the  future  of  the  post-Soviet  field  have  become  less 
consistent/militant. According to Rutskoi, the reintegration of the post-Soviet economic and political terrain 
should develop peacefully,  i.e. "from below". In our opinion, such an evolution is  a positive indicator of 
developing civil consciousness and "reconciliatory" political culture in Russian society.
5 Curiously enough, this notion may prove to be perceptive and innovative in the not too distant future. The 
passing of "International hegemonic regimes" is an objective process dating to the late sixties (Keohane R.O. 
After hegemony.  Cooperation  and  discord  in  the  World  Political  Economy. Princeton,  1984).  Moreover, 
"Superpower" is  basically a rather vague category whilst  the international  power relationships  have been 
profoundly transformed in recent years.
6 For an unbiased observer, this kind of broken continuity seemed to be unreasonable since Russia was an 
official  successor  of the former Soviet Union. In a country of a transcontinental  dimensions like Russia, 
foreign policy was always regulated by the rule of inertia.  Allies and strategic partners might change but 
principles of national security basically remain intact.
• inability and reluctance to define and defend Russia's vital interests in the "near abroad" (i.e. 
the post-Soviet geopolitical field), with particular reference to the human rights of the Rus-
sian-speaking people;
• unreserved identification of Russia's interests with those of the West. The latter was uncriti-
cally considered as a model structure functioning on the basis of universal cultural norms, 
principles  of  democracy,  humanism,  altruism,  and  social  progress.  Hence,  the 
unconditional support to various Western foreign policy imitatives, including those highly 
controversial for the common people;
• an isolationist approach to Russia's conduct of foreign policy on the Asian continent. This 
approach was indicative of the extremely passive policy with regard to such influential actors 
of international system as China and India, and towards such "new influentials" as South 
Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Taiwan,  etc.  There  arose  impression that  Russia  was 
seeking to sacrifice its economic and political interests in the Third World for the sake of 
being incorporated into "Euroatlantic" civilization7.
From 1992 onwards, certain actions and initiatives of the Russian government (civil and human 
rights of the Russians living in the "near abroad", political aspects of Russian-Japanese relations, 
attitude to the developments in former Yugoslavia, etc.) proved to be rather controversial and 
were efficiently exploited by the forces of radical nationalism. It became clear that the people and 
a  significant  part  of  intelligentsia  were  beginning to  question the  philosophical  and  moral 
foundations of the official foreign policy platform (the 1993  general elections and numerous 
public opinion surveys were convincing indicators of this trend). This makes the elaboration of a 
new foreign policy paradigm an urgent task responsible both for the modern realities of world 
politics and establishing a genuine role for the Russian Federation in the rapidly transforming 
international system8.
Alternative Foreign Policy Mode of Thinking
Three years of uncertainty demonstrated convincingly the necessity of a coherent, predictable and 
dynamic foreign policy. The pillar principles of a new foreign policy mode of thinking and acting 
can be summarized as follows.
First, a quick recovery from contemplative passivity to a dynamic, realistic and pragmatic as-
sessment of world development. A new dynamism could be a  substantial  element of foreign 
policy consensus in  Russian  society.  In  our  opinion, certain  events in  the outer  world will 
quicken the process of "coming together" for the main "actors" of Russian society and polity.
7 The present authors distinguish at least two "versions" of "Euroatlantism". The first mode of thinking can be 
identified  as  an uncritical  emulation  of  Western models  of  social  organization  and principles  of  foreign 
policy. The second regards Russia as a "vital" European power having strategic interests in Europe and in Asia 
as well. See, for example: Silin Ye. Ideya evroatlanticheskogo sotrudnichestva v evroasiatskoi strane (The idea 
of  euroatlantic  cooperation  in  a  euro-asian  country),  -  "Mirovaya  economica  i  mezhdunarodniye 
otnosheniya" ("World Economy and International relations"), 1993, No. 10, pp. 39-49.
8 It goes without  saying that  foreign policy of "universal human values" was based partially on a perfectly 
reliable moral formula "the priority of security for the individual should be superior to the interests of the 
state".  Partially  this  foreign  policy  approach  was  a  response  to  the  demolition  of  an  archaic  state 
superstructure (i.e. the Soviet State) and the objective weakening of forces of internal stability in Russia. 
Nevertheless, the passivity of foreign policy was a reflection of the lack of a theoretical approach to the global 
trends  shaping the international  system (fragmentation  of world economy and its  political  consequences, 
disintegration of the Soviet Union as a factor politically consolidating controversial economic interests etc.).
Second, the emphasis on geopolitics, from which Russia's international role was, is and will be 
defined. Geopolitics is the fundamental centre of force in the post-Soviet geopolitical field and 
also the foundation for a consistent and constructive search for geopolitical allies both in the 
"near" and "far abroad". The territory of the former Soviet Union is a sphere of vital interest for 
Russia, which should maintain its geopolitical coordination in this area.
Third,  foreign policy attention should  be  concentrated on the  Russians outside  Russia,  the 
protection of their rights should be supervised according to universally accepted international 
standards.
Fourth, Russia should not hesitate to use strong, dynamic and efficient tactics in the economic, 
political, and military spheres in geopolitical conflicts with any country, including with those 
which are industrially developed. Russia should exploit the potential of newly-emergent inter-
national system, particularly coming into vitality of "new influentials", not necessarily in the 
North Atlantic area (Brazil, etc.).
According to  us,  the new foreign policy platform should creatively combine the priority of 
Russian geopolitical interests, on the one hand, with the consistent democratization and liber-
alization of the economy and polity, on the other. The open political system is equally important 
for Russia for the obvious reason that such a model of state/civil society relationships will create 
preconditions for intellectual, cultural, economic and technological potential of the society to be 
fully utilized.
In our view, this geopolitical pragmatism better represents the interests of Civil Society and has a 
greater chance of becoming the foundation for national consensus on matters of foreign policy. 
Consequently,  this  approach can  facilitate  stabilization  of  the  political  situation  in  Russia, 
something in which the entire world community has a stake.
In any society, foreign policy perceptions exist and function at a minimum of there levels, namely 
state policy,  elitist  debate and that  of mass consciousness (i.e.  acceptance/opposition by the 
people to the current political course on the basis of their objective interests). Nowadays, all the 
three levels are prepared to accept a "geopolitical pragmatism" as a philosophical foundation of 
Russian foreign policy.
This kind of foreign policy orientation, first and foremost, denotes the security interests of the 
country and in no way questions the importance of relations with the industrially advanced 
nations. Moreover, this approach emphasizes the role of Western Europe and the United States to 
on even greater extent than the "Euroatlanticists" do, but only within the context of Russia's 
national interests.
Further, "pragmatic" foreign policy should take into consideration the geographical location of 
Russia.  The country was and remains not merely a  European power, but  also a  significant 
"Eurasian" power that possesses a substantial amount of strategic interests in Asia, foremost in 
the realms of economy and security. Therefore, Russia needs to develop partnerships with states 
that  can exert  an  influence on a  "Eurasian" scale.  Naturally,  "Pragmatic" foreign policy is 
inspired by historical reasons. Pre-1917  Russian Empire successfully operated on both Occi-
dental and Oriental directions gaining substantial political advantages and compensating for the 
serious defects of its economic and political system. "Pragmatists" will seek to preserve, if not a 
global role for Russia, then one of a common continental importance.9
Further, the pronounced role of Russia as a  vital Asian and Pacific power increases Russia's 
strength in European affairs. Preservation of Russia's age-old geopolitical role as civilized and 
strong equalizer is a main resource against geopolitical chaos, for the benefit of Europe and the 
world.
It's an open secret that the end of the militaristic confrontation between the two superpowers was 
a watershed in the world history in the sense that various other political "actors" are attempting to 
fulfill their own interests, not infrequently at the expense of the others. This development can 
unleash an avalanche of potentially uncontrollable geo-political changes. Such a chain reaction 
would threaten to spread across the entire globe. This is the reason why the industrially advanced 
nations of Europe, Asia and North America are vitally interested in preserving and strengthening 
the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. And this is precisely why they should 
be interested in the reemergence of a strong Russia.
In  addition,  there  exists  at  least  one  factor  of  fundamental  importance  that  favours  the 
"comeback" of pragmatism and geopolitics in Russia's foreign policy thinking. However para-
doxical this may seem, the end of the Cold War paved the way for the sudden growth of pe-
ripheral conflict and "national egoism" which previously had been restrained by the conditions of 
uncompromised  ideological  and  military  confrontation  between  the  two  superpowers.  The 
"Condominium" system objectively contained the development of inter-ethnic contradictions in 
the "peripheral" zones of the international system. By mid-90s, it  has become clear that  the 
regulation of international relations the way it was done under the conditions of classic bipolarity 
(by "the projection of military strength") and the re-creation of a manageable multipolar world 
model had proved to be illusory.
Under the conditions of growing uncertainty in the international system, it is once again time to 
creatively reassert the notion of fundamental share of responsibility of the United States and 
Russia for the world order. Under new conditions, this notion can be implemented not by the 
reemergence of ideological dispute, but  by means of coordinated efforts between the United 
States and Russia.
Regional Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy
In our opinion, Russia's foreign policy should resolve the following tasks in relation to the fol-
lowing principal countries and regions.
The "Near Abroad". The primary tasks of the Russian foreign policy in the region are the crea-
tion of on integrated economic space (where it is the will of the people) within the post-Soviet 
field and persistent introduction of the international standards of human rights attitudes, includ-
ing consistent defense of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. Russia should play a 
leading role in initiation of such norms in implementing interstate agreements.
9 For the coming century, the term "global power" (or "superpower") seems to be outdated for at least  two 
reasons. First, superiority is normally exercised through leadership in opposing ideological coalitions. In this 
case, the disintegration of the one coalition annihilates preconditions for the very existence of its rival and, 
subsequently,  for  the  hegemonic  power.  Second,  the  growing  regionalization  and  fragmentation  of  the 
international  system and,  consequently,  the  diminishing "governability" of  the  latter-  these  factors  are a 
plausible occasion for elaborating basic criteria of a novel type of "world actors", namely those of "vitality" 
and of "competitive advantages".
The idea of the "Euro-Asiatic Union" actively supported by President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan 
can be an important direction for Russia's foreign policy. The notion of the "Euro-Asiatic Union" 
being the continuation of the ideas of the late Academician Sakharov includes such principles as 
reestablishment of cooperative ties between the former Soviet republics, the protection of the 
outer  borderline  of  the  CIS,  the  reasonable  integration  of  monetary  systems of  the  newly 
independent States, the unification of the policy in such vital spheres as information, education, 
science and technology and so on. Such a policy approach, no doubt, will serve the best interests 
of Russia and the former constituent parts of the ex-Soviet Union.
The United States. Cooperation between Russia and the United States is envisioned in:
• the strengthening of conditions for nonproliferation throughout the world and the safe dis-
mantlement of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia is not in 
a position to resolve these problems on its own. At the same time, the fundamental interests 
of Russia and the United States in this area of foreign policy greatly coincide;
• bilateral  cooperation in protecting human rights in the former Soviet republics, including, 
most certainly, Estonia and Latvia; arms control, and, in the final analysis, the attainment 
of mutual  control over military potential. That is, cooperation in military efforts at the 
early stages of adoption of political agreements in the interest of strengthening international 
stability;
• reciprocal understanding as a prerequisite for a creative collaboration in the areas of potential 
or actual ethnic, confessional and racial conflicts. Such a cooperation could be a significant 
contribution to the maintenance of stability, particularly in the "peripheral" zones of the 
world system;
• development of  mutually  beneficial  bilateral  economic relations on a  non-discriminatory 
basis.
In  short,  a  possible collapse of the Russian-American cooperation would  aggravate  already 
existing problems such as various regional conflicts, military tensions in the Third World, nu-
clear  proliferation, international arms trade and political terrorism. Though these threats are 
much less spectacular than the prospect of a US-Soviet nuclear annihilation, they do deserve a 
serious consideration.
Europe. For various reasons, there exist among the West European governments certain reser-
vations concerning Russia's integration into the West European economic process. On the other 
hand, for many Russians, the necessity of such an integration is not indisputable. Nevertheless, 
there is a broad consensus in contemporary Russian society on the main directions of Russia's 
West European policy. According to widely shared notion, an orientation to bilateral cooperation 
with the three leading continental powers (Germany, France, Italy) and the United Kingdom is 
vitally important. Also, great importance is being attached to the nations of Southern Europe like 
Spain and Greece.
Cooperation with the aforementioned states will facilitate to demolish discriminatory regulations 
existing on foreign markets and to attain full-value participation in international division of 
labour. In this sense, Russia's collaboration with G-7, IMF and Post-COCOM institutions is quite 
relevant.
The process of transition in Europe, that is its cultural, economic and political dimensions, is still 
an object of rather animated debates in the country. With respect to Transition in Europe, three 
main ideological camps can easily be identified in contemporary Russian "political society"10.
1. "Romantic Democrats"11 are culturally and politically exposed to the West and are keen on 
Russia's involvement into NATO network. Such a policy is considered a pre-condition for 
an efficient Pan-European security system. Until recently, this elite group has ardently sup-
ported spontaneous convergence of erstwhile military blocs. According to such beliefs, 
NATO institutions and structures are well-equipped for gradual unification of its partici-
pants' controversial interests12.  Not long ago, "Radical Democrats" refuted as erroneous 
criticism emphasising that NATO is obsolete - both politically and militarily and that this 
organization had proved entirely unhelpful in various crises, the former Yugoslavia in 
particular.
2. "Pragmatists" ("Centrists") are heavily represented in the Federal legislative and executive 
bodies as well as in the Ministry for External Affairs and the Ministry for Defense. Their 
basic "European" perceptions can be summarized as follows:
3. the Warsaw Pact is non-existent now, so the threat to the West and its basic values is 
merely hypothetical. Hence, the territorial extension of NATO is logically and motiva-
tionally vulnerable;
4. Russia's contemporary military doctrine is entirely defense oriented. This doctrine is part 
and parcel of the country's modernization strategy aimed at strengthening internal stabil-
ity and developing Civil Society;
5. territorial extension of NATO will inevitably consolidate nationalistic sentiments within 
Russian Society and create a legitimate basis for significant reorientation of foreign pol-
icy resulting in  a  conspicuous shift from the principle of conflict resolution to  the 
concept of conflict "engineering";
6. geopolitical changes, now under way in Europe, may be effectively exploited by the na-
tionalists to remilitarize Russian Society and the very process of decision-making;
7. Russian economic and foreign policy cannot be exhausted by the European direction. Thus, 
Russia is equally interested in developing relations with Asia and the Pacific. These 
countries are considered as lucrative and capacious markets for the Russian industry. 
Some areas of the region are highly dynamic as far as economic growth is concerned. 
Besides,  the  Russian  establishment  is  fascinated  and  intrigued  by  the  notion  of 
transcontinental  transportation  system  ("Rotterdam-Shanghai  Cut").  This 
communication  network  is  supposed to  invigorate  the  whole  process of  economic 
transformation in Siberia and the Far East.
3. "Patriots" are traditionally suspicious of the West and its intentions, allegedly directed against 
Russia - from times immemorial onwards. Power captured, this grouping of Russian political 
elite will seek an adequate "counter-balance" to NATO extension. Naturally, if governed by 
10 Here, "Political Society" is referred to as an entity consistent of elite groups operating on federal and regional 
levels and shaping ideological  platforms of political  parties.  We presume that  for the analysis  of foreign 
policy  perceptions  this  narrow  ("elitist")  definition  seems  more  relevant  than  a  broad  sociological 
interpretation.
11 "Democrats" and "Patriots" are vivid examples of political  self-identification in contemporary Russia.  The 
present authors apply both terms neutrally, in a non-cognitive fashion.
12 It's worth noting in this context that the social support base of such perceptions is progressively shrinking.
"Patriots", Russia will join the "exploited" South against the "exploiting" North, will actively 
participate in various regional conflicts in areas of strategic importance and will openly side 
with the states considered as sources of permanent menace to the West. The transfer of power 
to "Patriots" is more a loud thinking than a political probability. Nevertheless, it should be 
kept in mind: Russian foreign policy will in the final analysis be shaped by the "figuration" of 
political forces to emerge after Parliamentary and Presidential elections. It is relevant here to 
remind: "pendulum tendency" cannot be entirely excluded.
The world is changing rapidly. Fastly transforming are such vital spheres of human activities as 
interest aggregation, ideological orientations and intellectual paradigms. Evidently such changes 
will sooner or later acquire new political dimensions.
In  our  opinion,  a  new intellectual  "paradigm" will  be  of  crucial  importance for  removing 
"barriers between East and West" in the years to come. This "paradigm", cosmopolitan and 
common sense oriented, is wholly based on newly-born geopolitical and geocultural perceptions 
gradually  gaining strength within  societies after  the  end of  the  "Cold  War".  Among these 
perceptions: diminishing unity of security policies, growing autonomy of international behaviour 
patterns, development of cooperative interests among nations and states, etc.
So far as Transition in Europe is concerned, one can easily enumerate 5 basic points, or intel-
lectual "pillars", of the aforementioned concept:
a) comprehensive understanding of traumatic historical experience of Eastern Europe that since 
the Napoleonic Wars was exploited as a  regular battle area and a territory of massive 
deployment and employment of military forces. The region suffered economically, politi-
cally, morally. After the Second World War, the states of Eastern Europe were hostages of 
the  doctrine of  "restricted sovereignty"  that  was brutally  put  into  force several  times 
(Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example);
b) territorial extension of NATO will definitely involve substantial financial responsibilities - re-
armament, re-training of personnel and, most of all, creating new operational and logistical 
infrastructure. Speaking realistically, the overwhelming share of these expenses can be re-
imbursed only by West European governments. It seems very easy to conclude that it is the 
West European electors/taxpayers who will ultimately decide the fate of such expenses and 
NATO extension. Further, a really professional discussion on NATO extension and its ex-
pected consequences has not yet started in the West. In this discussion, four nations will be 
perhaps more vociferous than others. Spain, Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy face 
certain problems of accelerating the pace of modernization and of surmounting the economic 
model of "dualistic growth".
Admittedly, NATO extension is interpreted by some interest groups in Southern Europe as a 
counterproductive diversion of resources vital for economic and social transformation;
c) an influential part of the West European political and economic elite has a feeling that NATO 
extension and  economic integration  go  together.  The  latter  denotes a  more  intensive 
competition in commodity and labour markets13 and eventual aggravation of existing social 
situation in Western Europe. This may result in serious regrouping of political forces in the 
direction opposite to the interests of ruling parties/coalitions in the region;
13 According to Western estimations, the joining of the EC by the "Vyshegrad Group" will increase migration 
inflow by 2-3 mln. people annually.
d) transition in Europe is a "contextual" phenomenon, it is closely interrelated with the build-up 
of a  new "exhaustive" security system sustained by common interests and universally 
shared attitudes to such "eternal" issues as ecology, demography and the "Third World";
e) for the nearest future a "newcomer" phenomenon is already discernible. This phenomenon 
may be of crucial  importance for the European political  process. The "newcomer" is the 
biological "renewal" of European "strategic" elites. Normally, this kind of "renewal" means 
eventual disappearance as political actors of public figures "parented" by the "Cold War" and 
accustomed to "ally-enemy" dichotomous mode of thinking. It is values and orientations of the 
"strategic" elites to come that  will  undoubtedly shape the basic features of domestic and 
foreign policies of the European powers.
Probably, three main factors, if operated properly, will help put an end to the historical division 
of Europe.
Firstly, the basic precondition for united Europe is the economic space being evenly developed. 
Putting it  differently, integration into the West European economic mechanism suggests that 
potential aspirants (i.e. nation-states) should transform national economy of the existing indus-
trial-agrarian type into the entity shaped and regulated by laws of Revolution in Science and 
Technology. The tasks for Russia and Eastern Europe, it is easy to guess, are identical.
Secondly, Russia and Eastern Europe are now facing exactly the same set of urgent problems 
relating to the domain of politics. Let us distinguish but a few of them: developing Civil Society 
and  seeking  the  latter's  reciprocally  suited  balance  with  the  State,  strengthening  feedback 
communication and sophisticating mechanisms of its self-sustained development, namely parties 
and party systems. The Political Institutionalization in Russia and Eastern Europe will make 
these countries' internal and external policies more clear-cut and predictable.
Thirdly, in a historical sense, Eastern Europe's Manifest Destiny is to re-emerge as a kind of 
geopolitical "bridge" connecting Western and Southern Europe with Russia, and exploiting to the 
full advantages of its geographical location and recapturing very capacious Russian market. That 
mode of behaviour is politically relevant for the obvious reason that economic integration into the 
West European institutions still  remains problematic,  at  least  for the time being. Economic 
cooperation based on vital  mutual  interests will  ultimately displace deep-seated anti-Russian 
fears  and  prejudices in  the  region.  Most  certainly,  this  process will  solidify psychological 
confidence and a sense of personal and collective security among the East European nations.
Asia and the Pacific. Russia's strategic interests in the region (first and foremost, the mainte-
nance of unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in the Far East) dictate estab-
lishing the system of regional security by taking on coordinated strategic functions. The problem 
of weapons delivery to the APR also ought to be subject for mutual agreement with the United 
States.
Russia is fundamentally interested in internal stability in the two most populous countries - China 
and  India.  The  three  countries'  long-term  interests  intersect.  They  are:  the  prevention  of 
fundamentalist challenge in neighbouring areas, namely in Central Asia; maintenance of strategic 
balance existing in the APR and the Indian Ocean; reciprocal economic cooperation, including 
transportation and other means of communication.
Traditionally Russia had good-neighbourly relations with Iran. Now, the latter is interested in the 
active economic and scientific exchange with the Russian Federation. This exchange is especially 
important for the Volga River regions like Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov and Samara possessing a 
large amount of highly qualified workforce and sophisticated technical and scientific cadres. The 
development of Russian-Iranian relations will help to reintegrate the latter into the international 
system and to make Iran's behaviour more predictable.
Pursuing a policy of sober, geopolitical "pragmatism", Russia is supposed to develop relations 
with those who truly support stability and do not threaten Russian national interests and security. 
Three  pillars  should  lay  the  foundation of  the  long-term foreign policy strategy.  First,  the 
establishment of its new identity which will ultimately help define Russia's place in the post-Cold 
War  international  system.  Second,  successful  implementation  of  economic  reforms.  Third, 
elaboration of an  adequate  decision-making and conflict  resolution mechanism between the 
executive and the legislative branches as  well  as  among diverse group interests in  Russian 
Society.
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Summary
Introductory Remarks
In recent years,  the basic principles and objectives of Russian foreign policy have been the 
subject of controversial  debate within Russia.  For outsiders, too, the actions of the Russian 
leadership have at times been difficult to comprehend. In the medium to long term, however, a 
coherent foreign-policy design is vitally important to Russia. The reasons for this are elementary: 
only a balanced and carefully deliberated foreign-policy strategy enjoying the support of society's 
main socio-political forces can protect the country from the imposition of "sectional" ideological 
schemes, from non-professional "experts", and from disputable international commitments.
The present report, from the pen of two prominent Russian scholars, attempts to formulate a 
framework for a foreign policy that preserves Russia's national interests and secures its interna-
tional position. Written before the presidential elections, the text and its fundamental handling of 
the problems involved point out possible paths for a Russian foreign policy for the future, too.
Findings
1. The time has come for Russian political elites to clearly define Russia's national interests. The 
absence of a coherent foreign-policy doctrine has compelled Western observers to express 
concerns about Russia's potentially unpredictable international behaviour. However, a new 
Russian foreign-policy strategy can only emerge out of intense conceptual debate within 
the  Russian  political  and  intellectual  elites  themselves.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
contemporary Russian society has no clear-cut social, political and, consequently, ideologi-
cal distinctions. Still, one can easily distinguish a series of foreign-policy perceptions that - 
naturally, with some reservations - can be regarded as political platforms: neocommunist, 
radical nationalist and traditional conservative paradigms, all feeding - in their different 
ways - on the Russian and/or Soviet past.
2. The post-communist government's foreign-policy philosophy has been mainly a contextual 
phenomenon. Having emerged as a rebuttal to the foreign policy of the communist era, it 
has unfortunately developed few creative principles of its own. It is common knowledge 
that, after the demise of the Soviet Union, practically all the country's traditional spheres of 
interest were abandoned, while new ones were not secured. The basic component of this 
foreign policy was the sacrifice of geopolitical considerations in favour of ideological no-
tions of an abstract democracy.
3. Three years of weakness and uncertainty have convincingly demonstrated the necessity of a 
coherent, predictable and dynamic foreign policy. The pillars of such a new design can be 
summed up as follows: firstly, a dynamic and pragmatic assessment of world development. 
Secondly, stronger emphasis on geopolitics, from which Russia's international rôle has al-
ways been and will in future continue to be defined. Geopolitical thinking must also be the 
foundation for a constructive search for allies in both the "near" and the "far abroad". For 
the territory of the former Soviet Union is a sphere of vital interest to Russia. Thirdly, for-
eign policy should be used as an instrument to protect the Russians living outside Russia. 
And finally, Russia should not hesitate to use strong, dynamic and efficient tactics in the 
economic,  political  and  military  spheres  in  geopolitical  conflicts  with  any  country, 
including those which are industrially developed.
4. At the regional level, the primary task of Russian foreign policy must be to create an inte-
grated economic space in the "near abroad" (provided this is the will of the people there) 
and to insist on the observance of international standards of human rights, also with a view 
to defending the rights of Russian-speaking populations elsewhere. Russia should play a 
leading rôle in implementing such norms in agreements between the states of the former 
Soviet Union.
5. Russia should cooperate with the USA especially in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and the safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union. Cooperation is also possible in protecting human rights in the former Soviet 
republics, in arms control to achieve international stability, and in reaching a reciprocal un-
derstanding as a  prerequisite for de-fusing potential ethnic, religious or racial conflicts. 
Such  cooperation  could  be  a  significant  contribution  to  the  maintenance of  stability, 
particularly in the "peripheral" zones of the world system. In their bilateral dealings, Russia 
and the USA should further develop their economic relations on a non-discriminatory basis.
6. As regards Europe, there are certain obstacles in that some West European governments have 
reservations about Russia's integration into the West European economic process while, on 
the  other  hand,  for  many  Russians  the  necessity  of  such  an  integration  is  itself  not 
indisputable. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus in contemporary Russian society that 
bilateral cooperation with the leading continental powers (Germany, France and Italy) and 
with  the  United  Kingdom is  vitally  important.  An  extension of  relations  with  these 
countries will facilitate demolishing discriminatory regulations still  in place on foreign 
markets and attaining full-value participation in the international division of labour. In this 
sense, Russia's collaboration in the International Monetary Fund, G-7 and the post-CoCom 
institutions is highly relevant.
7. The re-organisation of security structures - in particular the territorial expansion of NATO - is 
bound to involve considerable costs for the countries of Western Europe. The real debate 
about  the extension of NATO  has not yet  got  under way.  The countries of Southern 
Europe, which are interested above all in continuing their own economic and social trans-
formation and see the expansion of NATO as counter-productive, are also going to take 
part in that debate. This may result in a regrouping of the political forces in the region.
8. Russia's strategic interests in Asia and the Pacific are first and foremost the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in the Far East. This entails establishing a 
system of regional security and making the supply of weapons to the APR the subject of 
mutual agreement with the USA. Russia is fundamentally interested in the internal stability 
of the two most populous countries - China and India.
